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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, John Lonkey pied guilty to one count of burglary 
and one count of rape. He received an aggregate unified sentence of life, with twenty-
five years fixed. Mr. Lonkey appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction 
and asserts that the State breached its obligations under the terms of the plea 
agreement when the prosecutor speculated that the victim would probably ask for the 
maximum sentence the court could impose. The State's disavowal of the plea 
agreement deprived Mr. Lonkey of his right to due process of law. Mr. Lonkey also 
his sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On the night of June 21, 2013, John Lonkey was having car trouble. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) He knocked on the door of a 
closed bar and was admitted into the bar by the bartender, who allowed him to use the 
telephone. (PSI, p.3.) While inside the bar, he offered the female bartender $300 in 
exchange for sexual intercourse. (PSI, p.3.) After she declined his offer, Mr. Lonkey 
then threatened her with a knife and the two engaged in sexual intercourse in the 
bathroom of the bar. (PSI, p.3.) As he was leaving the bar, Mr. Lonkey took the 
cordless phone and broke it. (PSI, p.3.) Based on these facts, Mr. Lonkey was charged 
by information with one count of burglary, one count of rape, a deadly weapon 
enhancement, and one count of misdemeanor intentional interference with a 
telecommunications device. (R., pp.30-37.) 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Lonkey pied guilty burglary and in 
exchange for which the misdemeanor charge and the deadly weapon enhancement 
were dismissed. (11/8/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.20-25, p.8, Ls.14-21; R., pp.42-48.) Pursuant to 
the terms of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend an aggregate unified 
sentence of no more than forty years, with the sentences to run concurrently. (11/8/13 
Tr., p.6, Ls.3-6; R., p.42.) The defense was free to argue for less. (11/8/13 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.6-7; R., p.42.) 
At his sentencing hearing on January 24, 2014, the victim gave a victim impact 
statement. (1/24/14 Tr., p.5, L.6 p. 7, L.15.) After the victim's statement, the 
prosecution went through all of the aggravating facts, recited the terms of the plea 
agreement, and then said, "I think if the victim could articulate some other sentence, she 
would ask that there be the absolute maximum imposed and the defendant be directed 
to Department of Corrections forthwith. I think that's consistent with my discussions of 
her." (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-21.) The State made some additional comments about 
the nature of the crime, then asked the district court to sentence Mr. Lonkey to a unified 
sentence of forty years, with twenty years fixed. (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.10.) 
Mr. Lonkey's counsel asked for five years fixed, plus five years indeterminate, for a 
unified sentence of ten years on the burglary charge, and five years fixed, plus ten 
years indeterminate, for a unified sentence of fifteen years on the rape charge. (1/24/14 
Tr., p.12, Ls.24 - p.31, L.3; R., pp.54-55.) 
The district court's sentence far exceeded even the State's recommendation. On 
the burglary count, the district court imposed a sentence of ten years, with five years 
fixed, and on the rape count, the district court imposed a sentence of life, with twenty-
five years fixed. (1/24/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.1-5; 'R., pp.55, 68-69.) The court ran the 
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concurrently. (1/24/14 Tr., p.20, L.3; R., p.69.) On February 2014, 
Mr. Lonkey filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.71-74.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State its obligations under the plea agreement by disavowing the 
plea agreement and impliedly recommending a sentence greater than it had 
agreed to recommend, thus depriving Mr. Lonkey of his right to due process of 
law? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate unified 
sentence of life, with twenty-five years fixed, upon Mr. Lonkey following his pleas 




The State Disavowed The Recommendations It Was Obligated To Make Under The 
Plea Agreement, Thereby Circumventing And Breaching The Plea Agreement. Thus 
Depriving Mr. Lonkey Of His Right To Due Process Of Law 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor in this case had an obligation under the plea agreement to 
recommend a sentence of no more than forty years. However, the prosecution made a 
lengthy argument as to the aggravating factors present in Mr. Lonkey's case, followed 
by a recitation of the plea agreement, but it then speculated that the victim would 
probably ask for the maximum sentence (life). Because the prosecutor severely 
undercut the agreed-upon recommendation by implicitly asking the district court to 
impose the maximum sentence, the State disavowed the plea agreement and 
undermined Mr. Lonkey's plea. Therefore, Mr. Lonkey's sentence should be vacated 
and he should be resentenced before another judge. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]hether a plea agreement has been 
breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with 
contract law standards." State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73 (2005). 
C. The State Breached Its Obligations Under The Plea Agreement When It 
Disavowed The Plea Agreement By Impliedly Embracing A Sentencing 
Recommending Greater Than It Had Agreed To Recommend, Thus Depriving 
Mr. Lonkey Of His Right To Due Process Of Law 
Mr. Lonkey asserts that the State breached the plea agreement by effectively 
disavowing its agreed upon recommendations and impliedly embracing a much harsher, 
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alternative sentence, one speculatively endorsed by the victim. Due to the State's 
, Mr. Lonkey was deprived of his right to due of law. Mr. Lonkey 
requests that this matter be remanded for re-sentencing. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that plea bargaining is an essential 
component of the criminal justice system and that both sides should be held to their 
agreement. Santobe/lo v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971 ). Without plea 
bargaining, the courts would either become overloaded with criminal trials and grind to a 
halt, or would have to be expanded many times over. Id. at 261. Plea bargaining is 
also desirable because it speeds up criminal cases and leads to their prompt and final 
disposition. Id. 
"It is well established that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 
404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971 )). "This principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and 
the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and 
intelligent." State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775 (Ct. App. 2004 ). "If the prosecution has 
breached its promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was intentional or 
inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, for 
the defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false premise." State v. Jones, 139 
Idaho 299, 301-302 (Ct. App. 2003)). If "the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, 
[] his conviction cannot stand." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984 ). 
Thus, when the prosecution breaches the plea agreement, the defendant is 
entitled to relief. Wills, 140 Idaho at 775. As a remedy, the Court may order specific 
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performance of the agreement or it may permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty 
plea. Id. 
Further, "[o]ral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the court are 
generally held to be binding, especially when acted upon or entered on the court 
records, and need not be signed by the parties or their attorneys." Conley v. Whittlesey, 
126 Idaho 630, 633 (Ct. App. 1995). 
In State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 616-618 (1995), the State had agreed to 
recommend an indeterminate life sentence in exchange for the defendant's testimony 
against a co-defendant, but then, after recommending the indeterminate life sentence, 
put in evidence in aggravation. The Idaho Supreme Court held that despite the fact that 
the State recommended an indeterminate life sentence as required by the plea 
agreement, the evidence in aggravation required resentencing by a different judge. Id. 
It held that, "[a]llowing the state to make arguments and introduce the evidence in 
aggravation to the extent that was done was reversible error, because it was so 
fundamentally at odds with the position the State was obligated to recommend that it 
amounted to a violation of the agreement." Id. at 617. 
In Jones, supra, the Court of Appeals explained the Lankford holding: 
A prosecutor may not circumvent a plea agreement, however, 
through words or actions that convey a reservation about a 
promised recommendation, nor may a prosecutor impliedly disavow 
the recommendation as something which the prosecutor no longer 
supports. Although prosecutors need not use any particular form of 
expression in recommending an agreed sentence, their overall conduct 
must be reasonably consistent with making such a recommendation, 
rather than the reverse. 
State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 229, 301 (Ct. App. 2003) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). The Jones Court held that where the State had agreed to recommend 
retained jurisdiction, and in fact did so, but then also presented lengthy argument 
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emphasizing the violence of the defendant's offense, the defendant's history of violence, 
and defendant's refusal to take responsibility for his and implied that it 
never would have agreed to the plea agreement had it had full information on the 
defendant, the prosecutor "effectively disavowed the recommendation of retained 
jurisdiction and advocated a harsher sentence," thereby violating the plea agreement 
which necessitated a remand for resentencing. Id. at 303. 
In Wills, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that when the prosecutor only 
advocates for the agreed upon sentence as a minimum sentence, and further 
comments that the recommendation was made with "great restraint," the prosecutor 
failed to endorse the recommended terms as the ones the district court should accept. 
Wills, 140 Idaho at 776. 
Similarly, in State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 301 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of 
Appeals held that the prosecutor's argument, when taken in context with the entire 
proceeding, was fundamentally at-odds with the terms of the plea agreement. In 
Daubs, the prosecutor had agreed to recommend that the district court retain 
jurisdiction, but then emphasized that the presentencing investigator had recommended 
prison and explained the basis for that recommendation, including the defendant's 
crimes, his prior record, and his substance abuse problems. Id. The prosecutor then 
introduced the victim's parents, and prefaced their testimony by referring to the "horrific 
consequences" of the crime. Id. The Court concluded that "[t]he prosecution impliedly 
embraced the PSI recommendation, and constructively disavowed its recommendation 
of no more than a rider." Id. The Court held that the State failed to fulfill its side of the 
bargain and vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different 
judge. Daubs, 140 Idaho at 301. 
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In this case, Mr. Lonkey and the State entered into an oral plea agreement where 
Mr. Lonkey would enter a guilty plea to burglary and rape and the State agreed dismiss 
the misdemeanor and the enhancement, and seek a concurrent sentence on the two 
charges, "with an aggregate recommendation of no more than 40 years." (11/8/13 
Tr., p.6, Ls.1-6.) However, at Mr. Lonkey's sentencing, while the State indeed gave lip 
service to the plea agreement, the prosecution supposed that the victim would have 
wanted the "absolute maximum [sentence] imposed." (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-19.) 
Further, it presented evidence and argument emphasizing the appalling nature of the 
conduct and advocated that Mr. Lonkey should remain incarcerated for a lengthy period 
of time. (1/24/14 Tr., p.7, L.17 1 L.2.) 
At the sentencing hearing, following the testimony of the victim, the prosecutor 
began by stating: "[y]our Honor, this case represents egregious and appalling and 
intentional wanton conduct on the part of the defendant." (1/24/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-19.) 
The prosecutor went on to emphasize Mr. Lonkey's purported denial of this incident, his 
lack of remorse and his criminal history in spite of his young age. (1/24/14 Tr., p.9, L.9 
- p.11, L.11.) The prosecutor then recommended: 
The State's agreed to a 40-year cap. think if this victim could 
articulate some other sentence, she would ask that there be the 
absolute maximum imposed and the defendant be directed to 
Department of Corrections forthwith. I think that's consistent with my 
discussions of her. 
The recommendation that the State has under these egregious facts 
and circumstances are as follows: We do ask that judgments of 
convictions enter as to each of those two felonies. I think this case is 
one which calls loudly for the imposition of a lengthy penitentiary 
sentence. 
And, further, one of the criterion under the code is whether a lesser 
sentence would be appropriate and otherwise would minimize the 
significance of this offense. The State's recommendations in keeping with 
what was negotiated by way of resolution in this matter is for a period of 
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twenty fixed penitentiary, followed by twenty 
indeterminate. 
4 Tr., p.11, L.16 ·1 L.10 ( emphasis added).) The State then 
concluded its statements by saying: 
From the State's perspective, this defendant poses a great danger to other 
females and women in this community. A lengthy period of incarceration 
is required to address the severity of these offenses. 
(1/24/14 Tr., p.13, L.25 p.14, L.4.) 
As such, the prosecutor's comments were fundamentally at odds with the State's 
promised recommendation, and although the prosecutor uttered the recommendation 
required by the plea agreement, his other statements effectively disavowed that 
recommendation and affirmatively advocated a harsher sentence. Implicitly, the 
prosecutor asked for a life sentence. 
Just as was the case in Jones and Daubs, here the prosecutor failed to live up to 
his obligations under the plea agreement. Here, like in Daubs, the State paid but "brief 
lip service" to the agreed-upon sentence, and impliedly endorsed a fictional 
recommendation by the victim of the maximum sentence. When the State impliedly 
embraced the victim's fictional recommendation, it constructively disavowed the 
recommendation it had agreed to make in exchange for Mr. Lonkey's guilty plea. 
Further, like in Daubs, the state emphasized the "egregious facts and circumstances" 
present in this case and told the district court that "this case is one which calls loudly for 
the imposition of a lengthy penitentiary sentence." (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.2.) 
The prosecutor's conduct in disavowing and breaching the plea agreement entered into 
by Mr. Lonkey, whereby Mr. Lonkey waived numerous State and Federal Constitutional 
rights, is appalling under any view of the case. Therefore, under Jones and Daubs, the 
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prosecutor's conduct constituted a breach of the plea 
resentencing by a different district court judge. 
necessitating 
D. The State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement Constituted Fundamental Error 
Even though Mr. Lonkey did not object at the sentencing hearing, this Court is 
able to review the issue as fundamental error, pursuant to State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 226 (2010). To show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
alleged error: "(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 
368, 371 (Ct. App. 2011 ), rev. denied. The record in this case demonstrates that the 
breach of plea agreement was a fundamental error under the Perry test. 
1. The Error Violated Mr. Lonkey's Constitutional Right To Due Process 
Mr. Lonkey's due process right was violated when the prosecution breached the 
plea agreement. When a plea agreement relies on a promise of the prosecutor as part 
of the inducement or consideration, the prosecutor must fulfill his promise. State v. 
Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775 (Ct. App. 2004 ). "This principle is derived from the Due 
Process Clause and the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both 
voluntary and intelligent." Id. 
In Idaho, pre-Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals 
repeatedly held that the breach of a plea agreement constituted fundamental error. 
See, e.g., State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 7 4 (2005) (holding that claim of state's breach of 
plea agreement goes to the foundation or basis of the defendant's rights and, therefore, 
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constitutes fundamental error such that it may be reviewed for the first time on appeal); 
v. Allen, 1 Idaho 267, 271 (Ct App. 2006) (holding that state's breach of the 
plea agreement constituted fundamental error and, therefore, issue may be raised for 
the first time on appeal). 
After Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 256 
(2012), held that the breach of a plea agreement still constitutes fundamental error. In 
that case, the Court recognized that a breach of the plea agreement violated the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional right: 
Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are 
essentially contracts. When the consideration for a contract fails-that is, 
when one of the exchanged promises is not kept-we do not say that the 
voluntary bilateral consent to the contract never existed, so that it is 
automatically and utterly void; we say that the contract was broken. 
Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009)). Further, a claim that 
the State breached a plea agreement affects whether the agreement was knowingly or 
voluntarily entered into, thus it "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights." 
Id. (quoting State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho at 74). The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the 
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Puckett, and held that, "[i]f the State 
breached the plea agreement, the breach would go to the foundation of Gomez's 
rights." Gomez, 153 at 256. 
A plea agreement is essentially a contract. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137. See 
State v. Ruthetford, 107 Idaho 910, 913 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a defendant has a 
right analogous to a contract right once a plea bargain is entered); see also United 
States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying contract law standards to plea 
bargain agreements). However, "a plea agreement is more than a mere contract 
between two parties and 'must be attended by constitutional safeguards to ensure that a 
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defendant receives the performance he is due."' Craig v. Colorado, 986 P.2d 951, 
961 (Colo. 1999) (quoting People v. McCormick, 859 P.2d 846, 856 (Colo. 1993)). 
Since a guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights, when the State breaches 
a promise made to the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea, the defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to relief. Rutherford, 107 Idaho at 913. 
In this case, Mr. Lonkey contracted with the State. Mr. Lonkey agreed to enter a 
plea of guilty, thus eliminating the expense of a trial to the State and the emotional 
burden on the victim. In exchange for Mr. Lonkey's waiver of his constitutional rights, 
the State would cap its recommendation at 40 years. The State violated this agreement 
by offering the district court an alternative to the sentence it was obligated to 
recommend-speculation that the victim would have wanted the maximum possible 
sentence-thus disavowing the recommendation it had promised to make. 
Due to the State's implied request for the maximum possible sentence at the 
sentencing hearing, Mr. Lonkey was deprived of his right to due process of law 
guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho. As such, 
the sentence violated Mr. Lonkey's unwaived constitutional right to due process. Thus, 
the first prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
2. The Violation Of Mr. Lonkey's Constitutional Rights Is Clear And Obvious 
From The Record 
Further, the error is clear or obvious. The record is clear that the State 
disavowed the plea agreement immediately after it recited the agreed upon sentence by 
advising the district court that the victim would have probably asked that the maximum 
sentence be imposed upon Mr. Lonkey. (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-21.) Further, this was 
not a tactical decision by Mr. Lonkey's counsel. There is no strategic advantage to 
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permitting the State to advocate in favor of the maximum possible sentence, 
where the defendant waived all of his constitutional rights in exchange for a 
that the State would advocate for a lesser sentence. The State's disavowal of the plea 
agreement is a clear and obvious violation of Mr. Lonkey's right to due process. As 
such, the second prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
3. The District Court's Error Presumably Affected The Outcome Of The Case 
Because Mr. Lonkey may have received a longer sentence because the State 
disavowed the plea agreement by impliedly asking for the maximum sentence, the 
violation of his rights likely affected the outcome of his case. Indeed, instead of 
following the recommendations called for under the terms of the plea agreement, the 
district court sentenced Mr. Lonkey to the maximum possible sentence for rape-life in 
prison-which also happens to be the sentence implicitly recommended by the 
prosecutor. 
Further, had Mr. Lonkey known that the State would not honor its agreement to 
cap the sentencing recommendation at forty years; he may not have agreed to plead 
guilty to the charges. 
The record is clear that the plea agreement called for a recommendation by the 
State of no more than forty years. The record is also clear that the State circumvented 
the plea agreement by telling the district court a different sentence that the State 
supposedly believed the victim would have wanted. Thus, the third prong of the Perry 
test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
Because the State's breach of the plea agreement constituted a fundamental 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Unified 
Sentence Of Life 1 With Twenty-Five Years Fixed 1 Upon Mr. Lonkey Following His Plea 
Of Guilty To Burglary And Rape 
Mr. Lonkey asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of life, 
with twenty-five years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Lonkey does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Lonkey must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
is excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives 
of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. 
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Lonkey's sentence is 
excessive. The district court failed to consider the fact that Mr. Lonkey was previously 
successful on probation and that, with programming and supervision, Mr. Lonkey could 
likely be successful in the community. (See PSI, p.10.) Notably, Mr. Lonkey had 
15 
successfully completed his probationary term for his juvenile case; he met with his 
probation officer as scheduled and attended treatment. (PSI, p.10.) 
One important matter that should have received the attention of the district court 
is that Mr. Lon key has the support of his family members. See State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his 
family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 
348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) (reducing sentence of first-time offender who had a family 
depending upon him for support and who accepted responsibility for the offense at 
issue), overruled on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990). 
Mr. Lonkey has a good relationship with his mother, and he is also close with his 
brother and sister. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Lonkey's mother is very supportive of her son. 
(PSI, p.11.) She is aware that Mr. Lonkey has mental health issues, and she has 
attempted to get Mr. Lonkey the treatment he needs since approximately age eight. 
(PSI, p.11.) She told the presentencing investigator that Mr. Lonkey does well in a 
structured environment, and implied that supervised probation would be good for 
Mr. Lonkey. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Lonkey's family is very important to him-he is close to his 
siblings and his mother. (PSI, pp.11, 16.) 
Another mitigating factor the district court failed to fully consider was the fact that 
Mr. Lonkey was remorseful, and expressed his regret regarding his conduct. (See, e.g., 
PSI, pp.5-6, 17.) Mr. Lonkey wrote to the court, "I'm completely confused on why I did it 
and totally ashamed." (PSI, p.6.) Further, Mr. Lonkey knew he had done something 
wrong and took responsibility for his wrongful conduct by pleading guilty to the offense. 
(11/8/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-21; PSI, pp.5, 17.) 
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The of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has 
been in several cases. For example, in State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 
(Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when 
the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, 
his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. at 
209. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant's term of imprisonment 
because the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. In Shideler, Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's recovery from his poor mental and 
physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, 
coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the 
gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a crime. 103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the 
court reduced Shideler's sentence from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty 
years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593. 
Additionally, Mr. Lonkey suffers from depression and Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). (PSI, pp.9, 13-15.) He has also been diagnosed with 
oppositional defiant disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, antisocial personality 
disorder and schizoid typal personality disorder. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Lon key has been 
taking medication for his mental health issues since approximately age eight, but he 
started seeing a counselor at age five. (PSI, p.14.) Due to his mental health issues, 
Mr. Lonkey tends to isolate himself from others. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Lonkey has attempted 
suicide in the past. (PSI, pp.8-9.) As such, Mr. Lonkey's mental condition, when 
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sufficiently considered, indicates that a more lenient was appropriate. 
Hollon v. State, 1 Idaho 581 (1 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Lonkey asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts 
that had the district court properly considered his family support, remorse, and mental 
health issues it would have imposed a less severe sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lonkey respectfully asks this Court to vacate his sentence and to remand this 
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing, in front of a different district 
judge, with instructions that the State specifically recommend a sentence that strictly 
adheres to the plea agreement. Alternatively, Mr. Lonkey respectfully requests that this 
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 1ih day of August, 2014. 
SALLY,1. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appell le Public Defender 
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